Thought Experiments and Arguments
Haggqvist (Soren)
Source: Haggqvist - Thought Experiments In Philosophy, 1996, Chapter 5
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Sections

  1. Thought experiments are not arguments;
  2. Formalisation;
  3. Three proposals;
    • 3.1 Norton: inductive arguments;
    • 3.2 Laymon: deductions from possibilities and laws;
    • 3.3 Sorensen: thought experiments as paradoxes;
  4. An alternative proposal;
    • 4.1 A first formulation
    • 4.2 A better formulation
  5. Application to Central Cases
    • 5.1 The brain in a vat
    • 5.2 Twin Earth
    • 5.3 Oscar’s arthritis
    • 5.4 Searle’s Chinese room
    • 5.5 Newcombe’s problem

Comment:

Photocopy of complete book; Filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 07 (H)".

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