Meaning and the World Order
Fodor (Jerry)
Source: Fodor - Psychosemantics, Chapter 4
Paper - Abstract

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Introductory Paragraph1

  1. I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep.
  2. It's hard to see, in face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with (or maybe of their supervenience2 on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic.
  3. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: Numbering mine. The final sentense is alluded to in "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective: What Is The Problem?".


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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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