- Theodore Sider has recently produced an argument which he takes to show that three-dimensionalism is incompatible with the possibility of time travel1.
- I wish to argue that there is indeed a problem for the three-dimensionalist who wishes to countenance time travel2, but that Sider has misdiagnosed it.
- I show why his putative challenge fails, and furthermore that if it were to succeed this would be as problematic for a wide class of four-dimensionalist positions, including Sider's own, as it would be for three-dimensionalism.
- Finally, I present the problem that the possibility of time travel3 genuinely poses for the three-dimensionalist.
Philosopher’s Index Abstract
- The article explains whether time travel4 is a problem for the three-dimensionalist.
- The problem is that the three-dimensionalist holds the younger version and the older version to be numerically the selfsame being.
- The three-dimensionalist can countenance the distinction, by more or less the same means.
- Any qualitative dissimilarity may be used by the three-dimensionalist to differentiate between one of the role reversal possibilities and the other.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)