Is Time Travel A Problem For The Three-Dimensionalist?
Simon (Jonathan)
Source: Monist, July 2005, Vol. 88 Issue 3, p353-361, 9p
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Theodore Sider has recently produced an argument which he takes to show that three-dimensionalism is incompatible with the possibility of time travel1.
  2. I wish to argue that there is indeed a problem for the three-dimensionalist who wishes to countenance time travel2, but that Sider has misdiagnosed it.
  3. I show why his putative challenge fails, and furthermore that if it were to succeed this would be as problematic for a wide class of four-dimensionalist positions, including Sider's own, as it would be for three-dimensionalism.
  4. Finally, I present the problem that the possibility of time travel3 genuinely poses for the three-dimensionalist.

Philosopher’s Index Abstract
  1. The article explains whether time travel4 is a problem for the three-dimensionalist.
  2. The problem is that the three-dimensionalist holds the younger version and the older version to be numerically the selfsame being.
  3. The three-dimensionalist can countenance the distinction, by more or less the same means.
  4. Any qualitative dissimilarity may be used by the three-dimensionalist to differentiate between one of the role reversal possibilities and the other.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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