Classes, Worlds and Hypergunk
Nolan (Daniel)
Source: Monist; Jul2004, Vol. 87 Issue 3, p303-321, 19p
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Hypergunk seems possible: it seems metaphysically possible that there be an object such that all of its parts have proper parts, and for any cardinality, it has a set of parts of that cardinality. If hypergunk is metaphysically possible, many theories of possible worlds, as currently formulated, are false. This paper makes the case for the possibility of hypergunk, and shows how this is a challenge different from many of the other cardinality challenges in the literature. There is then a discussion of how theories of possibility, and related theories such as theories of logical consequence, might deal with this challenge. Focuses on hypergunk's consequences for modality1, citing its effect on formal semantics and model theory. Definition of gunk as stuff which is not made up of mereological atoms; Hypergunk's effect of causing problems for theories of possible worlds; Description of an object with parts; Explanation of the conflict with theories of possible worlds; Discussion of what should be done about this conflict.

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