Consciousness And Self-Consciousness
Kriegel (Uriah)
Source: Monist, Apr2004, Vol. 87 Issue 2, p182-205, 24p
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness1 are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness2 and the latter intransitive self-consciousness3. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness4, and that the common reasons for denying the dependence of consciousness upon self-consciousness5 apply only to transitive self-consciousness6. Argues that consciousness essentially involves self-consciousness7, in the sense that the former cannot occur in the absence of the latter. Familiar distinction between transitive consciousness and intransitive consciousness; Parallel distinction between two modes of self-consciousness8, called transitive self-consciousness9 and intransitive self-consciousness10.

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