<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Crane (Tim) - Perception (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7097.htm">Perception</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/C/Author_Crane (Tim).htm">Crane (Tim)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Crane - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2001, Chapter 5</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=800><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7097.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PapersToNotes_7097.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1069.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol start = "40" type="1"><li>The Problem Of Perception  130 </li><li>The Argument From Illusion  132 </li><li>Perception As A Form Of Intentionality  137 </li><li>The Phenomenal Character Of Perceptual Experience  140 </li><li>Inverted Spectrum, Inverted Earth  145 </li><li>Perception As Non-Conceptual  150 </li></ol> </FONT><BR><U>Section Summaries</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol start = "40" type="1"><li><b><a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1069.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP>  The problem of perception</b>: The phenomenological problem of perception distinguished from the epistemological and psychological problems; the phenomenological problem is a result of the conflict between the immediacy of perception and the 'Phenomenal Principle', once one allows the possibility of perfect hallucination. </li><li><b><a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1070.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>  The argument from Illusion</b>: The argument outlined, and its most plausible version defended; the argument is shown to rest on the 'Phenomenal Principle'. </li><li><b><a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1071.htm">Note</A><SUP>3</SUP>  Perception as a form of intentionality</b>: The way to solve the problem of perception is to give a correct account of the intentionality of perception; the 'Phenomenal Principle' rejected; the nature of perceptual contents and modes examined. </li><li><b><a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1072.htm">Note</A><SUP>4</SUP>  The phenomenal character of perceptual experience</b>: It is sometimes said that an intentionalist view of perception cannot account for the phenomenal character of perception; two kinds of evidence for this claim considered: introspective evidence and inverted spectrum/earth <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought-experiments</A><SUP>5</SUP>; introspective evidence shown to be inconclusive, once we understand intentionality in the proper way. </li><li><b><a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1073.htm">Note</A><SUP>6</SUP>  Inverted spectrum, Inverted Earth</b>: The inverted spectrum possibility (if it is one) presents no knock-down argument against intentionalism; Inverted Earth only presents a problem for a purely externalist version of intentionalism; if narrow perceptual content is coherent, then the inverted earth argument is unsuccessful. </li><li><b><a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1074.htm">Note</A><SUP>7</SUP>  Perception as non-conceptual</b>: A further aspect of the phenomenal character of perception introduced: its distinctness from belief and judgement; this is expressed by saying that perceptions have non-conceptual contents; this idea is clarified, motivated, and defended against its critics. </li></ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>For a prcis and analysis of the whole Book, see this <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1029.htm">Note</A><SUP>8</SUP>.<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><hr><br><B><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7097_9">Write-up</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7097_9"></A></u> (as at 12/02/2015 16:48:00): Crane - The Problem of Perception</B><BR><br>This is a review of Section 40 of <a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7097.htm">Crane (Tim) - Perception</A>", from <a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_420.htm">Crane (Tim) - Elements of Mind - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind</A>". For the previous Section (the last Section of Chapter 4  <a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7096.htm">Crane (Tim) - Thought</A>"), see this <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1068.htm">Note</A><SUP>10</SUP>. <BR><BR><u>Crane s Abstract</u> <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">The phenomenological problem of perception distinguished from the epistemological and psychological problems; the phenomenological problem is a result of the conflict between the immediacy of perception and the 'Phenomenal Principle', once one allows the possibility of perfect hallucination. </ol></FONT><BR><u>My Notes</u> <ul type="disc"><li>Crane says that this chapter is about the <em>intentionality</em> of perception, and <b><em>not</em></b> about either: <ol type="1"><li>The <b>psychology</b> of perception: the <em>mechanism</em> whereby the different senses convey information about the perceived environment to the brain. </li><li>The <b>epistemology</b> of perception: how perception gives <em>knowledge</em> of the world, eg. giving us reasons for beliefs. </li></ol></li><li>An intentionalist theory of mind needs to say something about how the various states of mind are <em>differentiated</em> or are <em>similar</em>, for instance perception versus belief and sensation. We also need to investigate and seek to understand the <em>phenomenal</em> character of perception. This philosophical study isn t in conflict with the psychological investigation of mechanisms, but focuses on the characteristics required of <em>anything</em> labelled perception, a harder task than might be expected. Crane claims that the problems are phenomenological  relating to our perceptual <em>experience</em>  and independent of psychological and epistemological questions. </li><li>Crane focuses on <em>visual</em> perception and finds a <em>conflict</em> between two plausible intuitions: <ol type="1"><li><b>Immediacy</b>: when aware of a material object in the world, we are immediately aware  our awareness isn t mediated by awareness of something <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7097_11">else</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7097_11"></A> that is <em>not</em> a material object. Here, visual experience differs from the other sensory modalities. A smell may well be physical, but it is not obviously an <em>object</em> (says Crane), even though what it is a smell <em>of</em>, and which the smell makes us aware of, is a physical object. Smells (and sounds) are intentional objects, but a physical thing that is an intentional object need not be a physical object. While we can coherently say that we smell by smelling a smell, or hear by hearing a sound, we don t see by seeing a look. Catching a glimpse isn t seeing a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7097_12">glimpse</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7097_12"></A>. Seeing is unmediated (Crane deals with the  television counterexample by saying that in that case one is immediately aware of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7097_13">television</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7097_13"></A>). </li><li><b>The Phenomenal Principle</b>: when one experiences something as F, there is something F that one is experiencing, whether this be  something red or  a goldfinch or such-like. </li></ol></li><li>The <em>conflict</em> between these two principles arises when we consider hallucinations, giving rise to the <em>argument from illusion</em> against the intentionality of perception, covered in the next section. A theory of the intentionality of perception also needs to address the difference between perception and belief, which Crane looks at in the last section of the book. </li></ul>The Note for the next Section is <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1070.htm">here</A><SUP>14</SUP>.<BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P7097_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7097_9"><B>Footnote 9</A></B></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (12/02/2015 16:48:00). </li><li><A HREF = "../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1069.htm">Link to Latest Write-Up Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7097_11"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7097_11"><B>Footnote 11</A></B></U>: Presumably Crane has no place for sense-data. This theory is discussed later.<a name="On-Page_Link_P7097_12"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7097_12"><B>Footnote 12</A></B></U>: This sounds like a quote from Wittgenstein.<a name="On-Page_Link_P7097_13"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7097_13"><B>Footnote 13</A></B></U>: I have residual questions about illusions and holograms.<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-17T12:04" pubdate>17/08/2018 12:04:33</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>