Four Objections to Frege's Notion of an Object
Wright (Crispin)
Source: Wright - Frege's Conception of Numbers As Objects, 1983, Chapter 2
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. The Characterisation of Singular Terms
  2. Dummett on the Role of Reference in the Semantics of Abstract Singular Terms
  3. Abstract Objects and Causality1: (I) Knowledge
  4. Abstract Objects and Causality2: (II) Reference

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