<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Rosen (Gideon) - The Limits of Contingency (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7162.htm">The Limits of Contingency</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/R/Author_Rosen (Gideon).htm">Rosen (Gideon)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: MacBride - Identity and Modality, 2006, Chapter 1</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7162.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperCitings_7162.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Editor s <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7162_1">Introduction</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7162_1"></A></u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In 'The Limits of Contingency' Gideon Rosen sets out to examine the <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> status of metaphysical and mathematical propositions. </li><li>Typically such propositions  that, for example, <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP> or aggregates or sets exist  are claimed to be metaphysically necessary. But such claims of metaphysical necessity, Rosen maintains, are inherently deficient. This is because the kinds of elucidation philosophers typically offer of the concept of metaphysical necessity fail to pin down a unique concept of necessity; in fact no conception exactly fits the elucidations given, and at least two conceptions  which Rosen dubs 'Standard' and 'Non-Standard'  fit the elucidations equally well. <ul type="disc"><li>According to the Standard Conception, the synthetic <em>apriori</em> truths of basic ontology are always necessary. </li><li>By contrast, according to the Non-Standard Conception, such truths are sometimes contingent. </li></ul></li><li>Consider, for example, Armstrong's claim that qualitative similarity between particulars is secured by the recurrence of immanent <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>4</SUP>. <ul type="disc"><li>By the lights of the Standard Conception this claim, if it is true, is metaphysically necessary. For whilst it is not a logical or a conceptual necessity  there is no reason to think its denial self-contradictory or otherwise inconceivable  it is not aposteriori either. </li><li>But, by the lights of the Non-Standard Conception, Armstrong's claim is contingent. For other metaphysical accounts that eschew <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>5</SUP>  in favour, for example, of duplicate tropes  are also compatible with the nature of the similarity relation. </li></ul>So, if it is true, Armstrong's claim tells us only about how similarity happens to be secured in the actual world; in other possible worlds similarity is secured differently. </li><li>Since philosophical elucidations of the concept of metaphysical necessity favour neither the Standard nor the Non-Standard Conception Rosen concludes that philosophical discourse about metaphysical necessity is shot through with ambiguity, an ambiguity that we ignore at our peril. </li></ol></FONT> <u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>What is Metaphysical Necessity? </li><li>An Informal Elucidation </li><li>A Question about the Informal Elucidation </li><li>The Standard Conception and the Differential Class </li><li>The Non-Standard Conception </li><li>The Two Conceptions and the Informal Explanation </li><li>Is the Non-Standard Conception Coherent? </li><li>Objections to the Standard Conception </li><li>Physical Necessity Reconsidered </li><li>Conclusion</li></ol></FONT><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P7162_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7162_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>From <a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7161.htm">MacBride (Fraser) - Identity and Modality: Introduction</A>", </li><li>Bullet numbering is mine. </li></ul><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:13" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:13:14</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>