Essential Properties and 'de re' Necessity
Fumerton (Richard)
Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 281-294
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Philosophers Index Abstract

    I argue that there is a sense in which it should be relatively uncontroversial that there are essential properties, but that there are no interesting metaphysical implications of this admission. I analyze the concept of an essential property in terms of the concept of "de re" necessity and then analyze the concept of "de re" necessity in terms of the concept of "de dicto" necessity.

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