Chisholm on Personal Identity and the Attribution of Experiences
Nida-Rumelin (Martine)
Source: The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Hahn, Lewis E, 565-585
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. Roderick Chisholm's nonreductivist view of transtemporal personal identity is, as he mentions himself in a footnote, intimately related to his insights about the special status of self-attribution. He did not, however, explicate this relationship.
  2. The paper attempts to fill this gap. An account of transtemporal experience attribution to oneself and to others is proposed that
    1. may be seen as a natural addition to Chisholm's own views about self-attribution and
    2. can be shown to imply Chisholm's claims about transtemporal personal identity.
  3. The paper attempts to explain why the nonreductivist view is an essential and nonrevisable part of our self-conception.

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