Review of 'The Emergent Self' by William Hasker
Baker (Lynne Rudder)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2002): 734-736
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. The aim of The Emergent Self is to present and defend a particular stance on the mind-body problem. Hasker’s strategy is to consider various versions of materialism (or physicalism; he uses the terms interchangeably), then to present objections that, he argues, are fatal to them. After a chapter defending libertarian free will, he critically surveys dualistic alternatives to materialism, and then offers his own version of dualism, Emergent Dualism. He concludes with a discussion of the metaphysical possibility of life after death.
  2. The Emergent Self is valuable not least because it runs so thoroughly against the grain of contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Hasker defends a kind of substance dualism. In motivating this now-neglected approach, he ranges over a considerable field, discussing, among other things,
    • Kim on supervenience1 and mental causation,
    • Frankfurt on alternative possibilities,
    • Nagel on panpsychism,
    • Swinburne on the soul,
    • O’Connor on agent causation,
    • van Inwagen on the impossibility of recreation, and
    • Searle on emergent features of systems.

Comment:

See Link. Also, William Hasker.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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