<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Baker (Lynne Rudder) - When Do Persons Begin and End? (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7312.htm">When Do Persons Begin and End?</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Distinguished Faculty Lecture, December 5, 2005</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7312.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PapersToNotes_7312.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u><b>Summary & Comments</b></u><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>What is a Human Person?</li><li>When Does a Human Person Come Into Existence?</li><li>When Does a Human Organism Come Into Existence?</li><li>Life and Death</li><li>When Do Persons and Organisms Die?</li><li>Conclusion</li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Introduction</u><ol type="1"><li>This paper is effectively the application of Baker s <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">Constitution View</A><SUP>1</SUP> of personal identity  that human persons are constituted by, but not identical to, their bodies  to the questions  when does the life of human persons begin and end , together with some ethical consequences for our answers. </li><li>Lest the they get lost in the recounting of the arguments, the quick answers to these questions are <ul type="disc"><li>The life of a human person <u>starts</u> when that human becomes a person  which is (for Baker) when that human achieves a <em>rudimentary <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">first person perspective</A><SUP>2</SUP></em>, which (she says) is at birth, or maybe just before. </li><li>The life of a human person <u>ends</u> when that (rudimentary or robust) first person perspective is irretrievably lost (barring  <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>3</SUP> ). </li></ul> </li><li>Baker is insistent that human persons are ontologically separate from the <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>4</SUP> that constitute them, and so the beginning and ending of the lives of the two are not necessarily coincident. </li><li>She starts by correctly pointing out the basic irrelevance of the 98.6% genetic similarity between humans and chimpanzees. <ul type="disc"><li>While it is true that this is 10 times closer that the genetic similarity between rats and mice, this isn t all there is to the story. </li><li>Baker doesn t really follow up on the remark that what we have here is encoding for proteins, which is not at all the same thing as mental life (say).</li><li>We are  perhaps slyly  referred to <a name="91"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20156.htm">Povinelli (Daniel) - Behind the Ape's Appearance: Escaping Anthropocentrism in the Study of Other Minds</A>". Povinelli  in contrast to much of the modern trend  is a supporter of the cognitive distinction between humans and the other Great Apes, and in particular with the suggestion that the Great Apes are cognitively equivalent to human 2-year-olds. </li><li>Povinelli points out that our 50% genetic similarity to the garden pea does not make us cognitively 50% similar. </li><li>But his main point arises from his experimental tests of chimpanzees cognitive abilities, leading to his claim that the great distinction between the cognitive capacities of humans and the great apes is that the latter cannot form abstract concepts, nor does he think they have a theory of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_5">mind</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_5"></A>. </li></ul></li><li>Baker has no great interest in any of this, as she claims that while biologists / geneticists ask: <FONT COLOR = "800080">what makes people human organisms, philosophers ask: What makes human organisms people? </FONT> </li><li>The fundamental question, assumed but wrongly answered (says Baker) in the bioethics debates is: <FONT COLOR = "800080">In virtue of what is an entity a human person?</FONT>, answers to which depend on <FONT COLOR = "800080">what kind of beings we human persons most fundamentally are </FONT>.</li><li>Baker has a useful footnote on the term  <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human being</A><SUP>6</SUP> . <ul type="disc"><li>Baker uses the term as a synonym for  <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_75.htm">human person</A><SUP>7</SUP> . </li><li>Others use it as a synonym for  <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_11.htm">human organism</A><SUP>8</SUP>,<a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_113.htm"><SUP>9</SUP></A>,<a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm"><SUP>10</SUP></A> .</li><li>So, <a name="92"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_541.htm">Perry (John) - The Importance of Being Identical</A>" has  human being as a purely biological notion, while</li><li><a name="93"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>" allows for psychological aspects, reserving the term  human organism for a purely biological kind. </li></ul></li><li>Baker s view is that our natures are not exhausted by our biology, and however thin the biological line is between us and the other Great Apes, there s a great ontological difference in the type of beings we are. </li></ol> <BR><u>What is a Human Person?</u><ol type="1"><li>Baker thinks we are not identical to our <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_11">bodies</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_11"></A>. Nor are we <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_12">Cartesian</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_12"></A> bipartite  Bodies plus Minds . Instead, she sees a third way, that of <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_62.htm">Constitution</A><SUP>13</SUP>. </li><li>According to the <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">Constitution View</A><SUP>14</SUP> we human persons are material beings, but are only constituted by our bodies, and our animal natures don t exhaust <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</A><SUP>15</SUP>. </li><li>She gives an example of the statue and the piece of marble that constitutes it, and shows they are not identical by pointing out their different persistence conditions and  important for this paper  that they are not coterminous. </li><li>We are referred to <a name="112"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>" for an explanation of (Baker s version of) Constitution. </li><li>As is well known, Baker thinks that the identity of a person is determined by a unique First-Person Perspective <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">(FPP</A><SUP>16</SUP>), which is both necessary and sufficient for its identity ( biological continuity being cited at the analogue for organisms). The key attributes are  an inner life , namely the ability to reflect on our thoughts, motives, beliefs, desires and actions and the ability to exercise self-control. This catalogue of abilities makes for a person with a <u>robust</u> FPP. </li><li>Baker contrasts persons with <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">Phase Sortals</A><SUP>17</SUP>, and her analogy is important. She says that being a wife is not essential to wives, whereas having a FPP is essential to being a person, as a person ceases to exist without a FPP, whereas a wife does not cease to exist on ceasing to be a wife. Is this argument sound? I don t think so. <ul type="disc"><li>The FPP is had by the <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>18</SUP>, just as the smile is had by the Cheshire Cat, and cannot exist without it. </li><li>Being a person is a property of another thing, reflecting that thing s capacities, and is not a thing in its own right. </li><li>There are some issues of reference here.  Wife is a relational term  of a female human being to a male. If there is no longer a marriage, then there is no longer a wife, though the female human being still exists. </li><li>Analogously, if the FPP permanently ceases, there is no longer a person. But that no more means that the person is ontologically separate from the human being than the wife is.</li><li>The analogy maybe isn t perfect (but then Baker introduced it, though not with this intent). Is the FPP a relational term? It seems so to me  it is a relation between a <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>19</SUP> and the world (something Baker doesn t mention), as well as to itself. </li></ul></li><li>Baker correctly points out that a <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>20</SUP> can live without a FPP (which is why <a name="109"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Eric Olson</A> claims that psychology is irrelevant to personal identity (given his claim that human persons are animals. She then claims that a person cannot live without a FPP: but, this strikes me as an error that recurs in her philosophy. She uses  life and  death  which seem to me to be biological terms, except as figures of speech  in non-biological settings. If a person is not fundamentally biological, then these terms don t apply to it. Better to use begin / cease (to exist) or some such. </li></ol><BR><u>When Does a Human Person Come Into Existence?</u><ol type="1"><li>Baker s answer is  a rudimentary FPP . <b>Rudimentary</b> is contrasted with <b>Robust</b>, introduced earlier. </li><li>There seems to be a degree of arbitrariness about all this, as will appear later. It seems to me that Baker has a time in mind (near birth), and other organisms she doesn t want to be given status as persons (namely, the Great Apes) and she fiddles her criteria in order to achieve these objectives. If PERSON was an ontological category, there would be more discovery and less stipulation about this. </li><li>She expatiates a bit more on the robust FPP, as it is clearly not applicable to infants, whom she wants to be accounted persons even though they would fail most tests. They don t have moral or rational agency or <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_21">language</A></U><SUB>21</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_21"></A>; they don t evaluate or <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_22">change</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_22"></A> their desires or assess their goals. In fact they are in a much worse state as far as the attributes of a robust FPP than are the Great Apes. What s to be done? </li><li>She notes that the brain has to be fairly well-developed even for a rudimentary FPP, so rules out <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>23</SUP> as persons, though is agnostic about <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_24">8-month</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_24"></A> <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetuses</A><SUP>25</SUP>. </li><li>Baker <em>defines</em> a <u>rudimentary FPP</u> as needing to satisfy three sufficient conditions <ul type="disc"><FONT COLOR = "800080"><li>i. She is a conscious, sentient being, and </li><li>ii) She has a capacity to imitate; </li><li>iii) Her behavior is not fully explainable except by the attribution of beliefs, desires and intentions. </FONT></li></ul></li><li>The trouble with this collection is that while (i) and (iii) are sensible enough, they are satisfied by most higher mammals and (ii) is both plucked out of the air and may both not be satisfied by infants and also satisfied by the Great Apes. </li><li>By way of immediate justification (by condition):- <ul type="disc"><li>i. Rather scarily, Baker notes the <em>NY Times</em> article:  Study Finds 29-Week <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">Fetuses</A><SUP>26</SUP> Probably Feel No Pain and Need no Abortion Anesthesia , August 24, 2005 (<a name="W1203W"></a><A HREF = "http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/health/study-finds-29week-fetuses-probably-feel-no-pain-and-need-no.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>), on account of the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_27">probable</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_27"></A> lack of neurological development. </li><li>ii) Baker claims that the <FONT COLOR = "800080">capacity to imitate involves differentiation of self and other</FONT>. Maybe it does, but do new-borns really have it, and do the Great Apes really not have it? There s a footnote to the effect that <FONT COLOR = "800080">the capacity to imitate has been linked by developmental psychologists to some form of self-recognition that does not require a self-concept</FONT>. So, this is a proxy for a self-concept, which new-borns (unlike the Great Apes) most likely don t have, </li><li>iii) Baker says that the offshoot of this condition is that a rudimentary <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_28">person</A></U><SUB>28</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_28"></A> must be an intentional agent. There s a supportive verbal assurance by some medic to the effect that  <FONT COLOR = "800080">pediatricians take the slightest signs of communication as the <em>sine qua non</em> that an infant is a person. Such signs satisfy the criterion of intentionality</FONT> . Firstly, anecdotal support is feeble. Secondly, if  the slightest signs of communication signify a person, then dogs are persons; which they are not. </li></ul></li><li>Baker claims that  <FONT COLOR = "800080">The properties that make up a rudimentary first-person perspective are themselves specifically personal (and not merely biological) properties</FONT> . Well, I agree that they are  not merely biological , but have the following <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_29">concerns</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_29"></A>:- <ul type="disc"><li><b>The ontological element</b>: the thought that a new thing comes into existence, rather than an existing thing gaining new and important properties  seems completely upside-down to me. </li><li><b>The evaluative element</b>: how are we to treat these  rudimentary persons ? Is it <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_30">important</A></U><SUB>30</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_30"></A> that (under normal circumstances) that they will develop into <u>robust</u> persons? </li><li><b>Consistency</b>: it is important that no speciesism or fixing the boundaries to be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_31">species-specific</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_31"></A> creeps into the analysis. </li></ul> </li><li>Baker claims that human new-borns satisfy her three conditions and so are rudimentary persons. <ul type="disc"><li>The first and third conditions are incontrovertibly satisfied (though satisfied to a lesser degree than in most other young mammals of the same birth-age due to human infants effectively being born prematurely). </li><li>The second condition is more controversially satisfied, or at least the import of the activity is far from obvious. It seems human new-borns will imitate <FONT COLOR = "800080">gestures of mouth opening and tongue protrusion</FONT>. No doubt they will, but what does this signify? That new-borns have a sense of self and other, or that this is some sort of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_32">reflex</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_32"></A>? </li></ul></li><li>Baker recognises that cats and dogs appear to have rudimentary FPPs, and that chimpanzees can be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_33">trained</A></U><SUB>33</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_33"></A> to recognise themselves in mirrors. </li><li>Baker has a footnote to the effect that <FONT COLOR = "800080">Although more evidence is needed about the cognitive development of chimpanzees, there is no clear evidence that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_34">chimpanzees</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_34"></A> have the capacity to construct higher-order representations that would allow conceptions of themselves as having pasts and futures.</FONT> Now, this has nothing to do with the possession of a rudimentary FPP (just when do human children achieve this cognitive development?), but  if true  would probably make it unlikely that the Great Apes can become robust <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_35">persons</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_35"></A>. </li><li>Because Baker s three conditions allow in some non-human mammals into the fold of rudimentary persons, and an individual with a rudimentary FPP is a person  period , she needs a reason to kick them out again. <ul type="disc"><li>She holds that human infants are persons while the non-humans aren t, because of the normal developmental potential of humans, and the lack thereof for primates.</li><li>Leaving aside for the moment the empirical claim that the Great Apes can never attain a robust FPP (and doubtless even robust FPPs come in degrees), there s still the question why  if normal developmental potential is the issue  Baker doesn t just stick with <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>36</SUP>, which have an identical potential. </li><li>The reason, I suspect, is a tension between her ontological claim about persons and her binary claims about rights. She can t claim a person  as a new ontological entity  comes into existence before any of the persona attributes  but she doesn t want to leave this emergence so late as to leave human infants without rights. </li><li>She clearly would not give up on her ontological claim, so it might be better for her to either give up on rights altogether (and replace them with the duties of moral agents), or to allow gradation of rights, so that rudimentary persons (of whatever species) have some rights, but less than those of robust persons. She might still end up with the favoured pecking order when we sadly can t save all of the baby, the chimp and the dog. </li></ul></li><li>So, Baker s thesis is <ul type="disc"><FONT COLOR = "800080">(HP) A <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>37</SUP> constitutes a person at time t if and only if it has a Rudimentary or a Robust First-Person Perspective at t. </FONT></ul></li><li>She notes that the temporal designation  at t is necessary because  while (for Baker) persons are essentially persons, <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>38</SUP>  which (may) constitute human persons  are not essentially persons  indeed they are <u>not</u> persons (derivatively) when they are <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>39</SUP>. </li><li>Baker notes what appears to be a change from <a name="113"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>", where she had it that a <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>40</SUP> becomes a person when it develops ether the actuality of, or the <em>structural capacity for</em>, a robust FPP. I m not sure whether (HP) is stricter or more lenient  it would depend partly on whether the structural capacity for a robust FPP develops before or after the realisation of a rudimentary FPP, but see the following bullet. </li><li>Baker is insistent that a severely retarded individual with a rudimentary FPP  even though that individual will never develop a robust FPP (and therefore presumably never develops the structural capacity for one)  <u>is</u> a person, because it is of a kind whose <u>normal</u> members develop a robust FPP; whereas a Great Ape, with maybe a stronger  but still rudimentary FPP  is <u>not</u> a person. This is nothing but speciesism, it seems to me. </li><li>Baker allows that there may be persons other than <u>human</u> persons  for instance silicon persons (constituted by  silicon items ) or God (not constituted by anything). </li><li>She also notes that  if her thesis is correct  anti-abortion arguments based on the premise that human <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">foetuses</A><SUP>41</SUP> are persons are <u>unsound</u>.</li><li>She makes an interesting point about the timing of origins. A human person begins to exist when it  comes to have a rudimentary FPP. She doubts there s an exact moment, but thinks that <FONT COLOR = "800080">nothing that we know of in the natural world clearly and unmistakably comes into existence at an instant</FONT>.</li><li>An abiding worry for me about all this is that ontology ought to be a process of <u>discovery</u> not of stipulation. She takes persons to be a <a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_80.htm">kind</A><SUP>42</SUP>. But, according to Baker, the (vague) time at which certain individuals of that kind come into existence has <ul type="disc"><li>(a) Something to do with the developing properties of a then numerically distinct individual of a different kind but also </li><li>(b) A dependency on the normal capacity-development of individuals of that different kind.</li></ul>(a) probably has its analogue in the statue and the clay, but (b) just seems to be a stipulation that has consequences that Baker likes, but others might not. </li></ol><BR><u>When Does a Human Organism Come Into Existence?</u><ol type="1"><li>Baker takes the question of when a human <u>organism</u> comes into existence to be a <u>biological</u> question (on which biologists have the last word), but that of when a human <u>person</u> comes into existence to be a <u>philosophical</u> question (on which empirical data is relevant but not conclusive). I have my <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_43">doubts</A></U><SUB>43</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_43"></A>. </li><li>She notes that fertilisation can take 20+ hours, so if this is when a human organism comes into existence, there is no exact moment. We are reminded that everything in the natural world comes into existence gradually, and we are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_44">referred</A></U><SUB>44</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_44"></A> to <a name="94"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20169.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality</A>". </li><li>But, this worry aside, the suggestion that fertilisation is the occasion a human organism comes into existence is  she says  logically impossible because of the possibility of <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">twinning</A><SUP>45</SUP>,<a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_58.htm"><SUP>46</SUP></A>. <ul type="disc"><li>This follows from the standard identity logic; if the blastocyst fissions, we will get two individuals which are not identical to one another, so neither can be identical to the pre-fission entity (well, one could, but that would be unprincipled favouritism). </li><li>She gives the usual background <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_47">biology</A></U><SUB>47</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_47"></A>.</li><li>She cites <a name="95"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12817.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Were You a Zygote?</A>" to the effect that <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>48</SUP> that might still twin are not human individuals, but only clusters of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_49">cells</A></U><SUB>49</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_49"></A>. </li><li><a name="96"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20170.htm">Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity</A>" is cited to demonstrate that there are several <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twinning-related</A><SUP>50</SUP> problems with the coming-into-being of organisms. </li><li>A footnote mentions <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_51">four-dimensionalism</A></U><SUB>51</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_51"></A>, and that it claims that the <a name="32"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twins</A><SUP>52</SUP> share stages. </li><li>Her conclusion is that <FONT COLOR = "800080">a frozen <a name="33"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryo</A><SUP>53</SUP> that is still capable of <a name="34"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twinning</A><SUP>54</SUP> is demonstrably <em>not</em> a human organism.</FONT></li></ul></li><li>Baker discusses the Roman Catholic position:- <ul type="disc"><li>The RC Church is agnostic on the <em>ontological</em> question whether or not an <a name="35"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryo</A><SUP>55</SUP> is a human organism. </li><li>Nevertheless it takes the <em>moral</em> stance that the <a name="36"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</A><SUP>56</SUP> be treated as a person, to be protected with the utmost care, abortion and infanticide being abominable crimes. </li><li>This <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_57">stance</A></U><SUB>57</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_57"></A> is independent of  <FONT COLOR = "800080">the time of <a name="37"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1012.htm">animation</A><SUP>58</SUP> or the  infusion of a spiritual soul</FONT> .</li><li>The stance of the RC Magisterium rests entirely on the (presumed) authority of the Church, and is a  pure decree not reliant on any philosophical argument. </li><li>Baker s concern with all this seems to be motivated by the RC Church s lack of philosophical argument or ontological claims  so they don t contradict her position because they don t engage with <em>any</em> philosophical position.</li><li>But she does have a footnote that mentions a RC claim that the fertilized ovum <FONT COLOR = "800080">would never be made human if it were not human already</FONT>. She notes that for this argument to have force,  human would need to be  human organism , which has not been argued. All human cells are  human already but are not thereby given especial protection. </li></ul></li><li>So, there can be no human organism until the implantation of the blastocyst, and even then the organism doesn t come into existence instantaneously, and she thinks there s no clear line of demarcation. She suggests that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_59">when</A></U><SUB>59</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_59"></A> the <em>primitive streak</em> appears, the <a name="38"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryo</A><SUP>60</SUP> becomes a human individual rather than just a mass of cells. </li><li>Since 60-80% of <a name="39"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>61</SUP> spontaneously abort without anyone knowing, she doubts they can be as precious as persons in the eyes of God. Who but an RC could disagree!</li><li>She quotes with approval <a name="110"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/G/Author_Gazzaniga (Michael S.).htm">Michael S. Gazzaniga</A>, to the effect that this statistic means that in IVF we re doing what nature does, in creating many fertilised ova, but only implanting a few.</li><li>Baker s parting shot in this section is that if there are sound arguments against aborting a 20-week-old <a name="40"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</A><SUP>62</SUP>, they ought not to be based on the premise that such a <a name="41"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</A><SUP>63</SUP> is a person. </li></ol><BR><u>Life and Death Die?</u><ol type="1"><li>Baker doesn t think we should follow the philosophical community and ask what life and death are, because the meaning of these terms (she says) depends on the individual whose life or death we are talking about.</li><li>She <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_64">defines</A></U><SUB>64</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_64"></A> the <b>life</b> of x as all the events x is a part of. And, for us  who are most fundamentally persons (she claims)  our life is that of a person. </li><li>Baker admits that philosophers have generally thought of life as a biological term. However, she list the following dissenters:- <ul type="disc"><li>The  influential <a name="97"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16159.htm">Stump (Eleonore) & Kretzmann (Norman) - Eternity</A>" says  <FONT COLOR = "800080">anything that is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_65">eternal</A></U><SUB>65</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_65"></A> has life</FONT> . </li><li><a name="98"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_807.htm">Boyd (Richard) - Materialism without Reduction: What Physicalism Does Not Entail</A>", says Baker, allows  conscious life without biological properties . This is a consequence of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_66">functionalism</A></U><SUB>66</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_66"></A>, which allows for mental properties being multiply-realised. However, the actual quotations seem to allow even more  something I ve not come across amongst materialists  that mental events might (in other possible worlds) be  non-physically realised & even if the body of the subject no longer exists . </li><li><a name="99"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6635.htm">Hershenov (David) - The Death of a Person</A>", adopts the <a name="42"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</A><SUP>67</SUP>, but offers a  contrasting account of life and death.</li><li>Baker objects to the expression  the sanctity of life on the grounds that  life is an abstraction, and suggests that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_68">real</A></U><SUB>68</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_68"></A> people (who may indeed be sacred) with real lives should not be made to suffer for the sake of an unanchored abstraction. </li></ul></li><li>Baker says that <em>life</em> is a <u>property</u> that can be had by different kinds of being. </li><li>In particular, the life of a person is not identical to that of the human organism that constitutes it (whose life starts earlier and  we will see  may finish later); yet it is important to note that there are not <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_69">two</A></U><SUB>69</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_69"></A> lives going on. </li><li>Baker has a slightly curious footnote on the  right to life . <ul type="disc"><li>Her view is that only persons have a right to life. </li><li>So, she thinks that the  life to which there is a right is personal life, the sort of life only had by persons. </li><li>But she mentions the option of the  right to lifers of extending the right to the other Great Apes. So, presumably this is granting a right to biological life (as Baker doesn t think the non-human Great Apes are persons) in the special case of the Great Apes (as granting it to all life would be extravagant and impractical). </li><li>And even the right to personal life is not absolute, she says, though her example is strange. </li><li>She considers a premature baby whose life can only be prolonged temporarily by extraordinary procedures that leave it in excruciating pain. She  correctly and humanely  says that this is unspeakably cruel, and that it would be better to let the baby die  or (even better) to hasten its demise by a lethal injection, despite the fact that it is a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_70">rudimentary</A></U><SUB>70</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_70"></A> person. All well and good, though somewhat consequentialist in its ethics. But has this anything to do with a  right to life ? It seems more to do with there being no absolute  duty to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_71">live</A></U><SUB>71</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_71"></A> . </li></ul></li><li>Baker has another footnote where her concept of some Great Chain of Being is mentioned. <ul type="disc"><li>It seems that persons are of a higher primary kind than are organisms, as organisms constitute persons, and not vice versa. Constitution provides a collating sequence. </li><li>So, biological life is just one aspect of personal life, but personal life is not an aspect of biological life, though she concedes that it may be so  derivatively . </li></ul> </li><li>Baker now turns her attention to <a name="43"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_67.htm">death</A><SUP>72</SUP>. <ul type="disc"><li>Her approach is the same as to life, of which death is simply the cessation  the end of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_73">career</A></U><SUB>73</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_73"></A>.</li><li>She ignores for the sake of the argument any possibility of <a name="44"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>74</SUP>, as this is the convention in bioethics debates; but, she notes <a name="100"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5626.htm">Shoemaker (David) - Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension</A>". </li></ul> </li></ol><BR><u>When Do Persons and Organisms Die?</u><ol type="1"><li>As for Baker death is simply the end of a career: <FONT COLOR = "800080">different kinds of entities die under different circumstances</FONT>. </li><li>For organisms, death is cessation of biological function. </li><li>A footnote refers us to <a name="114"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_89.htm">Feldman (Fred) - Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death</A>", where  her colleague argues that a dead animal is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_75">still</A></U><SUB>75</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_75"></A> an animal. </li><li>Baker thinks that a person  as distinct from an organism  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P7312_76">dies</A></U><SUB>76</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P7312_76"></A> when there is a permanent loss of the FPP. While it is still physically possible to recover the FPP, the person  even if unconscious  still lives. </li><li>Baker offers two means of person-death: permanent cessation of higher-brain functioning or, more commonly, of general biological functioning. Either will result in permanent loss of the FPP. </li><li>Baker notes that there are different criteria for the death of the <a name="45"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>77</SUP>, but only mentions <a name="46"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1028.htm">whole-brain death</A><SUP>78</SUP>, the symptoms being irreversible coma, no brainstem response, no EEG activity and inability to breathe independently. </li><li>Brain-death is to be distinguished from a <a name="47"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_111.htm">PVS</A><SUP>79</SUP>, where the patient can breathe independently, but the cerebral cortex has shut down so there is no cognitive functioning.</li><li>Baker asks whether the person has died if the <a name="48"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>80</SUP> is in a PVS. The answer  according to the <a name="49"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</A><SUP>81</SUP>  depends on whether it is physically possible for the patient to recover. If not, then the person  but not the organism  has died. Post-mortem showed that this had indeed been the case with Terri Schiavo (see <a name="W1209W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terri_Schiavo_case" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>). </li></ol><BR><u>Conclusion</u><ol type="1"><li>The <a name="50"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</A><SUP>82</SUP> implies that both the beginnings and endings of persons and human organisms may differ. </li><li>Baker allows that  if there is an <a name="51"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">afterlife</A><SUP>83</SUP>  a person may continue to exist after the destruction of the human organism, but is silent on whether such continued existence is continuous, or involves an intermission of existence. </li><li>Many ethical matters are beyond the scope of Baker s paper; but, she allows that the mother s life  in addition to that of the <a name="52"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</A><SUP>84</SUP>  is morally relevant in questions of abortion. Her aim has merely been to establish which entities are persons. </li><li>She closes by suggesting that the <a name="53"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">CV</A><SUP>85</SUP> harmonises Darwinian biology  whereby human persons are biological beings continuous with the rest of the animal kingdom  with the concerns of philosophers, who recognise what biology doesn t  that the FPP  even if it evolved by natural selection  distinguishes persons from all other beings. </li></ol><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>See <a name="W2969W"></a><A HREF = "http://people.umass.edu/lrb/files/bak05whebM.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: This was rather surprising, but then so was his reporting that chimpanzees will use gestures to beg for food from blindfolded carers (or those with buckets on their heads). <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_11"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_11"><B>Footnote 11</B></A></U>: It is rather sloppy in my view, to fail to distinguish <a name="54"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_18.htm">bodies</a> from <a name="55"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_113.htm">organisms</a>. In the text here, she equates the two, but she means  organisms . We are not most fundamentally animals. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_12"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: My rendering is compressed, but Baker doesn t seem to represent Descartes view that we are most fundamentally  Thinking Things , and indeed simple substances, and not anything combined at all. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_21"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_21"><B>Footnote 21</B></A></U>: There s no discussion of the possibility of an innate <em>language of thought</em> here or elsewhere. See <a name="56"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1011.htm">Click here for Note</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_22"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_22"><B>Footnote 22</B></A></U>: We might mention <em><a name="57"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_107.htm">wantons</a></em> here. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_24"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_24"><B>Footnote 24</B></A></U>: Well, babies are often born much earlier than this, so presumably this question should not be in doubt  we can test the ones that are born to see whether they satisfy her criteria. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_27"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_27"><B>Footnote 27</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Again, aren t babies occasionally born this early, and do they display pain-sensitive reactions? </li><li>And, if they do, how much more likely is it that (contrary to expectation) they do in fact have the relevant  nerve connections than that they do not?</li><li>Interestingly, just after writing this, I got the  Samuel Armas email forwarded to me by a friend. See:- <ol type="1"><li><a name="W1204W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Armas" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (Wikipedia)</li><li><a name="W1205W"></a><A HREF = "http://urbanlegends.about.com/library/bl-handofhope.htm" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (Defunct) (Urban Legends)</li><li><a name="W1206W"></a><A HREF = "https://www.snopes.com/photos/medical/thehand.asp" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (Snopes)</li><li><a name="W1207W"></a><A HREF = "https://www.truthorfiction.com/babysamuel/" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (Truth or Fiction). </li></ol></li><li>Basically, this is a case of <em>in utero</em> surgery on a 21-week <a name="58"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</a> to correct spina bifida. It is alleged that the baby s hand reached out and grabbed the surgeon s finger, and the photo (which is genuine) does make it look that way. However, it seems that the surgeon denies this, and says that the <a name="59"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</a> was anaesthetised, so would not have been able to move.</li><li>Obviously, this is a <em>cause celebre</em> touted by the anti-abortion lobby, so there will be pressure to promote or deny depending on which side of the fence you sit. But, I think (at the very least) it should suggest caution. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_28"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_28"><B>Footnote 28</B></A></U>: Baker actually uses the expression  a being with a rudimentary first-person perspective . <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_29"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_29"><B>Footnote 29</B></A></U>: Some of these issues are addressed by Baker later in the paper, but it s worth logging them here. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_30"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_30"><B>Footnote 30</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Yes normal developmental potential is important  see p. 9 of Baker s paper. </li><li>But if potential is important, why apply it to  rudimentary persons and not to <a name="60"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">foetuses</a>? It looks like a mistaken ontological claim can have nasty ethical consequences.</li><li>It seems to me that there are three temporal elements involved in how we treat individuals, and that the three tenses may be in conflict. </li><li><b>The future</b>  as Baker points out, the normal potential of the individual is important. There are controversial claims I d like to support in this regard: the rarity of the individual is important  it is more important to save the last pair of dodos than a pair of mallards; if the genetic dice have shuffled up a genius, that child is more important to save than a dullard (<em>cateris paribus</em>); a younger person has more future ahead of them than an older.</li><li><b>The present</b>: it is the <em>present capacity</em> to suffer or enjoy fulfilment that is probably paramount, subject to the future potential and past accumulated qualities.</li><li><b>The past</b>: an individual s history is an important determinant of how we treat them now, and intend to treat them in the future (maybe even after death), though the reasons are many and complex. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_31"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_31"><B>Footnote 31</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Take my dog, Henry. Sometimes he likes to play, and will take something he knows he shouldn t in order to be chased. When there s nothing appropriate easily available, he ll take one of his chews and use that. No doubt a behaviourist would explain all this by associative learning. The <em>principle of charity</em> only applies to other philosophers, dogs not being capable of irony. </li><li>But, what s the principled reason for choosing  imitation as the second condition for rudimentary personhood, other than complex play  which surely distinguishes self from other  other than that human new-borns would fail it and dogs pass?</li><li>As we will see, the odds are stacked in any case, because a fourth condition (normal developmental potential) will ensure no non-humans get classified as even rudimentary persons. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_32"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: Such as the sucking reflex, though the imitative behaviour is much more sophisticated. In any case, I ve no doubt that mothers can  connect with their babies, and in the absence of significant motor-coordination in a baby, mouth and tongue are their only method of communication (beyond squawking). But don t mother dogs  connect with their puppies? <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_33"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_33"><B>Footnote 33</B></A></U>:  Trained is a weasel word as it could imply associative learning. Do apes have to be  trained to pass the  mirror test , or do they do it spontaneously? See <a name="115"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_514.htm">Desmond (Adrian) - The Ape's Reflexion</A>", and later works. It seems that the Great Apes just need time to acclimatize (as do human infants) rather than training as such. Monkeys, however, may never  get it . See <a name="101"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20167.htm">Gallup (Gordon G.) - Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_34"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_34"><B>Footnote 34</B></A></U>: So, she claims that <FONT COLOR = "800080">it looks as if the scope of the self-concept that Gallup postulated to explain mirror behavior is really quite limited, contrary to Gallup s speculation</FONT>. This relies on Povinelli, as against <a name="111"></a><A HREF = "../../Authors/G/Author_Gallup (Gordon G.).htm">Gordon G. Gallup</A>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_35"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: Baker has it that there are persons  who have rights  and non-persons  who don t. This binary system strikes me as pernicious. It may make decision-making easier, but leads to needless injustice and cruelty. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_43"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_43"><B>Footnote 43</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>My worry here is that  according to Baker  persons make an <u>ontological</u> difference, which is associated with the emergence of a rudimentary FPP. So, wouldn t developmental psychologists have the last word? </li><li>Philosophers are on the periphery, both on the biological and psychological questions, to check methodology and the like. </li><li>Obviously, philosophers can t define organisms into existence  they are there to be discovered by naturalists and explored by biologists. </li><li>If persons are a kind, they can t be defined into existence by philosophers either; presumably they are also discovered  maybe by the first individual with a robust FPP. But not, I suspect, by philosophers. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_44"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_44"><B>Footnote 44</B></A></U>: This appears in an interesting issue of <em>The Monist</em> which discusses <em>Coming into Being and Passing Away</em>. The other papers, which include one by Olson, are:- <ul type="disc"><li><a name="102"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20174.htm">Belshaw (Christopher) - My Beginnings</A>",</li><li><a name="103"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20171.htm">Galton (Antony) - On the Process of Coming into Existence</A>",</li><li><a name="104"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20170.htm">Koch-Hershenov (Rose J.) - Conjoined Twins and the Biological Account of Personal Identity</A>" (cited above),</li><li><a name="105"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20173.htm">Liao (S. Matthew) - The Organism View Defended</A>",</li><li><a name="106"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20172.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - How Real Is Substantial Change?</A>", and</li><li><a name="107"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7074.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Paradox of Increase</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_47"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_47"><B>Footnote 47</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Only in passing: the Wikipedia entry (for instance) <a name="W1208W"></a><A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_embryogenesis" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> gives more background - essential background as this is a biological matter and philosophers need to tread carefully! </li><li>Basically, the fertilised ovum is known as a <em><a name="61"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</a></em> which then undergoes cell division to forma a <em>morula</em> of about 32 cells, and then cell differentiation until it becomes a <em>blastocyst</em>, which implants after about 7 days from conception. </li><li>The term <em><a name="62"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryo</a></em> refers to the individual from <a name="63"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</a> to about 9 weeks, when the term <em><a name="64"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</a></em> is used.</li><li>Philosophers often ask whether you  yes you  were ever a <a name="65"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</a>, <a name="66"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryo</a>, or <a name="67"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</a>; but not, as far as I know, a morula or a blastocyst. But it s useful to know the difference. </li><li>Baker mentions the term <em><a name="68"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">pre-embryo</a></em> used collectively of the <a name="69"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</a>, morula and blastocyst prior to implantation. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_49"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_49"><B>Footnote 49</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have difficulty with this. Baker admits that an option is that the <a name="70"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</a> is a short-lived individual that goes out of existence when it first divides, but denies that it s a human organism. </li><li>It might indeed fail to be an <a name="71"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_113.htm">organism</a>, but it is not just the single-celled <a name="72"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</a> that s at risk of <a name="73"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twinning</a>, but so is the Morula.</li><li>The <a name="74"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryo</a> might well be considered a parasite, in that it is dependent on the mother s body  its host  for most (maybe all) life-support functions (though it maintains its own cell metabolism as does a parasite). Yet parasites are still individuals and organisms. </li><li>Fission is a perennial problem for identity-theorists, which is why 4D is so attractive on this basis. But in denying that a  bundle of cells isn t an individual of any kind simply on the basis that it may fission. What then are viruses, or amoebae, which do little but fission. Are they not organisms, and individuals of a particular kind?</li><li>There is a question whether they are the sort of thing that persists through fission. On a 3D account they cannot, for the sort of reasons Baker gives, but they do persist on the 4D account of persistence. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_51"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_51"><B>Footnote 51</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Baker gives no references, and doesn t distinguish <a name="75"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Perdurantism</a> from <a name="76"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_761.htm">Exdurantism</a>; </li><li>nor does she mention that 4D completely solves the <a name="77"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twinning</a> problem (to its satisfaction, and whatever other philosophical problems it may cause).</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_57"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_57"><B>Footnote 57</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Baker doesn t comment on what her view on this is, but I would have thought she doesn t consider either  <a name="78"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1012.htm">animation</a> or  the  infusion of a spiritual soul to be real events. </li><li>For Souls: <a name="79"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_100.htm">Click here for Note</A>.</li><li>For Animation: <a name="80"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1012.htm">Click here for Note</A>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_59"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_59"><B>Footnote 59</B></A></U>: This claim just comes out of the air. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_64"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_64"><B>Footnote 64</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Baker actually claims that her usage is non-stipulative, nor is it metaphorical as we talk of  the life of a diplomat .</li><li>However, as I say in my Note on <a name="81"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_942.htm">Life</a>, she is confusing two terms  a <em>career</em>, an extended event which can apply to individuals other than biological organisms, and <em>life</em> strictly-so-called, which cannot.</li><li>Individuals that continue to have a career, even though they aren t alive in the biological sense, can be said to have life in a metaphorical sense (as our only direct acquaintanceship with individuals that have careers is with organisms). </li><li>She quotes John 10:10, about the follower of Jesus having life  more abundantly . She states that this isn t talking about biological functioning. Maybe not, though the assumption is most likely that they will be functioning biologically. But in any case, in Jesus day, biological life was not understood, so  life had different connotations. Indeed, the defeat of vitalism is one of the triumphs of modern biology.</li><li>She also quotes the expression  living God , where the term is  living is not used biologically. But this scriptural expression denotes existence, or maybe power, which is not ad by  idols . </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_65"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_65"><B>Footnote 65</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Does this include abstract objects, like numbers? </li><li>Just what is meant by  eternal ? </li><li>I suppose I ought to read this paper, but it s a long way down the queue. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_66"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_66"><B>Footnote 66</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m suspicious of functionalism, as I suspect consciousness may be  hardware-dependent . </li><li>Boyd s paper is an attack on Kripke, and sounds fantastical from what Baker says, though presumably wouldn't be in <a name="116"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_173.htm">Block (Ned), Ed. - Readings in Philosophy of Psychology - Vol 1</A>" unless it was useful. In the queue. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_68"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_68"><B>Footnote 68</B></A></U>: So, Baker favours the rights of the mother over those of the  unborn child  but only because she doesn t consider the <a name="82"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</a> a person, and so it has no rights (according to her). <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_69"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_69"><B>Footnote 69</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This strikes me as a complete muddle. </li><li>There <u>are</u> two lives going on, but they are not at all the same kind of thing. </li><li>One is an extended event; the other is a biological process.</li><li>Baker, however, thinks that they are the same sort of thing  both are  careers , though one is of a person, and the other of the human organism that constitutes it. </li><li>For Baker, because they are the same kind of thing happening concurrently, there is a need to ensure we only count one life.</li><li>This reflects Olson s <em><a name="83"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Master Argument</a></em> for <a name="84"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</a> (for a handy formulation and <a name="85"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">critique of this argument</a>, which Olson calls the <em><a name="86"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Thinking Animal argument</a></em>, see <a name="108"></a>"<A HREF = "../../Abstracts/Abstract_14/Abstract_14450.htm">Zimmerman (Dean) - Problems for Animalism</A>"); to the effect that we have too many of what-have-you, and we don t know which we are (the person-person, or the animal-person), or are enjoying (the person-life, or the animal-life) if the human person is non-identical to the <a name="87"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. </li><li>Baker hopes to avoid double-counting by using her  derivative terminology developed in <a name="117"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>". So, a person may have a biological life derivatively, and a human organism may have a personal life derivatively, and we only count non-derivative things or events. </li><li>I take it that the same events take place in  both lives at the times they overlap; yet, if we take biological life seriously, there are all sorts of metabolic processes that go on that the person is unaware of, and which can t really be said to be part of the person s <em>career</em>; only some major or unusual biological event that impinged on the person s concerns  like breaking a leg, or being unable to go to the concert because you had a cold  would fit the bill. . </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_70"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_70"><B>Footnote 70</B></A></U>: Does she allow the same latitude to robust persons, one wonders. If not / so why not / so? <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_71"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_71"><B>Footnote 71</B></A></U>: So, we have no right to force the baby to live when it would (most likely) prefer not to. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_73"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_73"><B>Footnote 73</B></A></U>: Again, my view is that  death is a purely biological term, and reflects the irrevocable cessation of biological life, so only biological organisms can die. Application of the term to non-biological individuals is purely metaphorical. <a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_75"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_75"><B>Footnote 75</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Feldman is wrong, in my  and Olson s  view. </li><li><a name="88"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">Corpses</a> and organisms have different persistence conditions, so one cannot be identical to the other. </li><li>But see the  <a name="89"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">Corpse Problem</a> for <a name="90"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P7312_76"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P7312_76"><B>Footnote 76</B></A></U>: As I ve said before, this seems an incorrect use of a biological term. It s also stipulative  not something that has been discovered. <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T06:57" pubdate>02/08/2018 06:57:24</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>