The Ontology of Abortion
Engelhardt (H. Tristram)
Source: Ethics, 84, No. 3, Apr., 1974, pp. 217-234
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    The question of abortion1 turns primarily upon the status of the fetus2. I argue that in considering human life one must distinguish between human biological life and human personal life. Moreover, there are, so I contend, two senses of persons. The first denotes self-conscious, moral agents. The second denotes instances of human life which can and must play active, social roles. Neither of these characterizations can be made to apply to fetuses3, in particular non-viable fetuses4. Since our obligations are solely to persons, there is, therefore, no one wronged in abortion5, in particular the abortion6 of non-viable fetuses7.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - March 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page