On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic
Merricks (Trenton)
Source: Mind, 107, Number 428, October 1998, pp. 845-846
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This short paper is a response to "Hawley (Katherine) - Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic", Mind 107 (1998: 841-843).
  2. Hawley's paper is itself a response to my "Merricks (Trenton) - Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience" Mind 107 (1998): 59-71.


Annotated printout in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 11 (M2: Me+)".

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