|On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic|
|Source: Mind, 107, Number 428, October 1998, pp. 845-846|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Books / Papers Citing this Paper||Notes Citing this Paper|
Philosophers Index Abstract
This short paper is a response to Katherine Hawley's "Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic," Mind 107 (1998: 841-843). Hawley's paper is itself a response to my "Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience," Mind 107 (1998): 59-71.
See "Hawley (Katherine) - Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic" and "Merricks (Trenton) - Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience". Annotated printout in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 11 (M2: Me+)".
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