On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic
Merricks (Trenton)
Source: Mind, 107, Number 428, October 1998, pp. 845-846
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this Paper


Philosophers Index Abstract

    This short paper is a response to Katherine Hawley's "Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic," Mind 107 (1998: 841-843). Hawley's paper is itself a response to my "Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience," Mind 107 (1998): 59-71.

Comment:

See "Hawley (Katherine) - Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic" and "Merricks (Trenton) - Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience". Annotated printout in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 11 (M2: Me+)".

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - September 2017. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page