Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis
Menzies (Peter)
Source: Philosophy of Science 56, No. 4, Dec., 1989, pp. 642-663
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation1 developed by david lewis. I argue that lewis's theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving preemption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation2 requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation3, within the framework developed by lewis, which captures this intuition.

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