Biological Species as Natural Kinds
Kitts (David B.) & Kitts (David J.)
Source: Philosophy of Science 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 613-622
Paper - Abstract

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JSTOR Abstract

    The fact that the names of biological species refer independently of identifying descriptions does not support the view of Ghiselin and Hull that species are individuals. Species may be regarded as natural kinds1 whose members share an essence which distinguishes them from the members of other species and accounts for the fact that they are reproductively isolated from the members of other species. Because evolutionary theory requires that species be spatiotemporally localized their names cannot occur in scientific laws. If natural kind2 status is denied to species on this ground, it must also be denied to most classes of concrete entities which are now accorded such status.

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