|Universals, the Essential Problem and Categorical Properties|
|Source: Ratio 18.4, December 2005, pp. 462-472(11)|
|Paper - Abstract|
There are three outstanding issues raised by my critics in this volume. The first concerns the nature and status of universals1 (John Heil). The second is ‘the essential problem’, which is the issue of how to distinguish the essential properties of natural kinds2 from their accidental ones, and the related question of whether we really need to believe in the essences of natural kinds3 (Stephen Mumford). The third is that of strong versus weak dispositional essentialism (Alexander Bird), or equivalently, whether there is any place for categorical properties in an essentialist metaphysic (John Heil). This paper addresses these three issues.
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