Modal Fictionalism: A Response to Rosen
Brock (Stuart)
Source: Mind, 102, No. 405. (Jan., 1993), pp. 147-150
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    Gideon Rosen, in his paper "Modal1 Fictionalism" ("Mind", 1990) puts forward and defends what is intended to be an ontologically neutral alternative to modal2 realism. I argue that Rosen does not achieve this goal. His fictionalism entails realism about possible worlds. Moreover, any attempts to modify the analysis results in an undesirable multiplication of the modal3 primitives, a problem faced by those who take the standard modal4 operators as primitive.

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