|On That Which is Not|
|Wheeler (Samuel C.)|
|Source: Synthese 71, 1979, pp. 155-173|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Summary||Books / Papers Citing this Paper|
Philosophers Index Abstract
This paper expands and develops arguments from the author's "Reference and Vagueness," Synthese1, 1975. It argues that none of the ordinary 'middle-sized' objects of the 'given' world exist. This conclusion is prepared for by a sketch of the main presuppositions of the theory of reference which lies behind the general argument that all such counter-common sense claims must be false. The digression destroys the rational grounds for resistance to the sorites2 arguments which establish the main point.
Footnote 1: See "Wheeler (Samuel C.) - Reference and Vagueness".
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