Is Causation a Genuine Relation?
Menzies (Peter)
Source: Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, Lillehammer, Hallvard (ed), 196-211
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    This paper defends the view that causation1 is an intrinsic relation. D. H. Mellor has argued that causation2 is not a genuine relation at all. I consider Mellor's arguments for this claim, and similar arguments advanced by other philosophers. I suggest that such skeptical views are mistaken, and offer an account of causation3 based on the idea that the truthmakers for all causal claims are intrinsic relations or processes. The central feature of the treatment is the relativization of the notion of an intrinsic property or relation to a system of a certain kind.

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