Kant and Reductionism
Cassam (Quassim)
Source: Review of Metaphysics 43 (Sept. 1989), pp. 72-106
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    I argue for a conception of the subject which is neither Cartesian nor, in Parfit1's sense, "reductionist." The self is not a Cartesian soul, but the unity of consciousness cannot be described in impersonal terms, as required by reductionism. Kant's suggestion that there is a connection between the unity of consciousness and experience of objects is discussed and supported by means of an argument which draws upon the writings of Shoemaker and Evans. The Kantian account of unity is held to undermine Humean accounts of the self.

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