| Locke on the Ontology of Matter, Living Things and Persons |
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| Chappell (Vere) |
| Source: Philosophical Studies 60 (1990), pp. 19-32 |
| Paper - Abstract |
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Philosophers Index AbstractAfter some remarks about his ontology in general, I lay out Locke's conception of three of the kinds of things he holds there to be: material masses, organisms, and persons. These all belong to the more general category of compounded substances, but differ in the nature of their elements and in the manner of their compounding. In the case of organisms and persons, I argue, Locke is committed to a doctrine of double existence: two distinct things at the same place and time. Some of my account is speculative; but much of it is directly supported by textual evidence.
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