Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem
Slote (Michael)
Source: Journal of Philosophy 79, No. 1. (Jan., 1982), pp. 5-24
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    Defenses of incompatibilism that rely on the dual necessity of past events and natural laws assume that such necessity is closed under conjunction introduction and in other ways like ordinary logical necessity. But it turns out that certain familiar forms of alethic necessity flout the usual alethic-modal1 principles, and by explaining how the same can be true of the necessity at issue in the free-will controversy, the above-mentioned incompatibilist arguments are called into question.

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