When the Will Is Free
Fischer (John Martin) & Ravizza (Mark)
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics. (1992), pp. 423-451
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    Peter van Inwagen has argued that acceptance of a modal1 principle employed in the standard argument for incompatibilism entails that (even if causal determinism is false) we are rarely, if ever, free to do otherwise. We present an argument against van Inwagen.

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