Philosophers Index Abstract
- An examination and clarification of the claim that 'man is nothing but a physical object' reveals that any variety of physicalistic monism involves a usually unrecognised commitment to what is here called the entailment thesis ('entailment' being used in a specially wide sense). (The identity thesis is incidentally seen to be neither necessary nor sufficient for physicalism.)
- A counter-example to the causal analysis of mental concepts is used as a basis for an argument against this entailment thesis and thus against physicalism in general.
Author’s Abstract
- 'Man is nothing but a physical object.' This slogan will serve as the starting point for an attempt to reach a clear statement of what is involved in the materialist view of man. Though I think the resulting statement is reasonably clear, it goes beyond what is usually thought to be implied by materialism, and will probably seem too restrictive. Nevertheless, I shall argue that it is logically implied by any view of man which remains true to the rationale of materialism. That accounts for the first half of my paper.
- In the second half (secs. II-IV) I shall expound and discuss a certain objection to materialism. The form the objection takes is suggested by the arguments used in the first half.
- If I am right in both halves of my paper, all materialist theories of man are false.
- If I am right in the first half but wrong in the view I defend in the second, a materialist theory of man is true.
- If (to be more realistic) I am wrong in both, the discussion may still help to clarify some of the issues.
Comment:
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