Disjunctivism
Blatti (Stephan)
Source: The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, ed. A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle, N. Goulder (Continuum, 2006), vol. 2: 856–57
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperColour-ConventionsDisclaimer


Author’s Precis

  1. A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different.
  2. Those who advocate disjunctivist1 theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge.
  3. This brief entry outlines two such theories:
    1. The disjunctivist2 theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, Travis) and
    2. The disjunctivist3 theory of appearances (McDowell).

Author’s Introduction
  1. There is some irony in the observation that the various views which fall under the heading of ‘disjunctivism’4 share a common form.
  2. A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different.
  3. In principle then, there is no restriction on the subject matter about which one might develop a disjunctivist5 theory. But in fact, those who advocate disjunctivist6 views have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge.

Comment:

See Blatti - Disjunctivism.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2020. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page