|Source: The Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy, ed. A. C. Grayling, A. Pyle, N. Goulder (Continuum, 2006), vol. 2: 856–57|
|Paper - Abstract|
A theory is disjunctive insofar as it distinguishes genuine from non-genuine cases of some phenomenon P on the grounds that no salient feature of cases of one type is common to cases of the other type. Genuine and non-genuine cases of P are, in this sense, fundamentally different. Those who advocate disjunctivist theories have (for the most part) been concerned with perception and perceptual knowledge. This brief entry outlines two such theories: the disjunctivist theory of experience (cf. Brewer, Hinton, Martin, Snowdon, Travis) and the disjunctivist theory of appearances (McDowell).
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