<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Blatti (Stephan) - Animalism and its Implications (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7624.htm">Animalism and its Implications</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Blatti (Stephan).htm">Blatti (Stephan)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: OU Website (now deleted)</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=600><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7624.htm">Paper Summary</A></td><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PapersToNotes_7624.htm">Notes Citing this Paper</A></td><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><u>Comment</u><BR><BR>This is a summary of Stephan Blatti s PhD Thesis (from 2005). It is especially important from my perspective as it covers much of the ground I wish to cover, so I need to ensure I ve something original to say. <BR><BR><U>Author s Abstracts</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li><b>Precis</b>: In a series of six, interrelated but self-standing chapters, I argue for and explore some consequences of the view known as '<a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>1</SUP>'. <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>2</SUP> is the view that each of us is identical to a particular animal and that our persistence conditions are biological. Its main rivals include various Lockean proposals, according to which, since each of us is identical to a particular person, our persistence conditions are psychological. Since the early 1990s, there has emerged a literature surrounding the debate between <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>3</SUP> and Lockeanism. And while their topics are varied, each chapter of this dissertation is intended as a contribution to that debate.</li><li><b>Chapter 1: <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>4</SUP> Unburdened</b>: Two theories - <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>5</SUP> and Lockeanism - compete for favour in contemporary discussions of personal identity. In this chapter, I educe and criticize a previously unacknowledged Lockean bias, viz. the claim that their capacity for self-consciousness renders persons radically discontinuous from other animals. The philosophical untenability and empirical implausibility of this uniqueness claim necessitates a reassessment of the debate between <a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>6</SUP> and Lockeanism. The burden now rests with the latter to disprove the former.</li><li><b>Chapter 2: Varieties of <a name="7"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>7</SUP></b>: As much as neo-Lockean theories, anti-Lockean theories of personal identity begin from - if only to repudiate - the conceptual framework bequeathed by Locke. In this chapter, I show how distinct formulations of <a name="8"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>8</SUP> emerge from different strategies for rejecting Locke's view. Whereas the first, Somatic <a name="9"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>9</SUP>, holds that the fundamental nature of (human) animals is physical, the alternative, Organic <a name="10"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>10</SUP>, maintains that the fundamental nature of (human) animals is biological. In defence of Organicism, I introduce an account of animal persistence that avoids the problems which render Somaticism untenable.</li><li><b>Chapter 3: Objections to <a name="11"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>11</SUP></b>: The purpose of this chapter is to answer five key objections to <a name="12"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>12</SUP>. The first objection that I consider derives from Ted Sider's argument that talk of personal identity is semantically indeterminate as between the bodily criterion and the psychological criterion. Contra Sider, I argue that Organic <a name="13"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>13</SUP> fares at least as well as, if not better than, its bodily and psychological rivals. The next two objections are what I call duplication objections. An example of this kind of objection takes its cue from cases of <a name="14"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_68.htm">dicephalus</A><SUP>14</SUP>  an actual condition that occurs when (prior to implantation) a human <a name="15"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1174.htm">zygote</A><SUP>15</SUP> fails to divide completely, resulting in a two-headed human being, each of whose brains supports a distinct mental life. The anti-animalist objects that, because they instance two persons but only one organism, <a name="16"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_68.htm">dicephalic</A><SUP>16</SUP> <a name="17"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1173.htm">twins</A><SUP>17</SUP> provide a counter-example to the <a name="18"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist s</A><SUP>18</SUP> claim that each of us is numerically identical with a single <a name="19"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>19</SUP>. Two more objections fall under the heading of transfer objections. A familiar example of this type of objection is the imaginary case of a <a name="20"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplant</A><SUP>20</SUP>, in which your <a name="21"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>21</SUP> is transferred into a <a name="22"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum-less</A><SUP>22</SUP> body. Against the <a name="23"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</A><SUP>23</SUP>, it is objected that such an operation would have the effect of transferring you to a new body. If this intuition is correct, the anti-animalist concludes, you were not identical to the <a name="24"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>24</SUP> in which you formerly resided. My reply to these transfer objections is largely methodological.</li><li><b>Chapter 4: Essentialism, Taxonomy, and Homo Sapiens</b>: In this chapter, I consider how <a name="25"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>25</SUP> might be rendered compatible with two (related) views which enjoy great popularity amongst evolutionary biologists, systematists, and philosophers of biology. The first view is simply anti-essentialism about species. According to the second view, a species (like Homo sapiens) is not a <a name="26"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kind</A><SUP>26</SUP>, but a natural individual: not a class whose members instantiate certain essential properties, but a historical entity whose parts are genealogically-related organisms.</li><li><b>Chapter 5: Constitution, Art Objects, and Self-Reference</b>: In this chapter, I attack the so-called '<a name="27"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">constitution view</A><SUP>27</SUP>' from a rather oblique perspective. Those who defend the <a name="28"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">constitution view</A><SUP>28</SUP> make much of an analogy with art objects. Their thought is that, just as (for instance) the statue is non-identically constituted by the piece of marble, so too the person you are is non-identically constituted by an animal. I exploit this analogy, argue (on purely aesthetic grounds) for the falsity of the claim about art objects, and then apply that moral to our case. Along the way, I explore what the <a name="29"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</A><SUP>29</SUP> should say about self-reference.</li><li><b>Chapter 6: <a name="30"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>30</SUP>, Vegetarianism, and Potentiality</b>: In this final chapter, I consider some of the possible ethical implications of the <a name="31"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</A><SUP>31</SUP> position - arguing that, in the case of vegetarianism, there aren't any, and that with respect to the so-called 'potentiality problem' (in the debate about abortion), there are. </li></ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T07:01" pubdate>02/08/2018 07:01:27</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>