This is a summary of Stephan Blatti’s PhD Thesis (from 2005). It is especially important from my perspective as it covers much of the ground I wish to cover, so I need to ensure I’ve something original to say.
- Precis: In a series of six, interrelated but self-standing chapters, I argue for and explore some consequences of the view known as 'animalism1'. Animalism2 is the view that each of us is identical to a particular animal and that our persistence conditions are biological. Its main rivals include various Lockean proposals, according to which, since each of us is identical to a particular person, our persistence conditions are psychological. Since the early 1990s, there has emerged a literature surrounding the debate between animalism3 and Lockeanism. And while their topics are varied, each chapter of this dissertation is intended as a contribution to that debate.
- Chapter 1: Animalism4 Unburdened: Two theories - animalism5 and Lockeanism - compete for favour in contemporary discussions of personal identity. In this chapter, I educe and criticize a previously unacknowledged Lockean bias, viz. the claim that their capacity for self-consciousness renders persons radically discontinuous from other animals. The philosophical untenability and empirical implausibility of this uniqueness claim necessitates a reassessment of the debate between animalism6 and Lockeanism. The burden now rests with the latter to disprove the former.
- Chapter 2: Varieties of Animalism7: As much as neo-Lockean theories, anti-Lockean theories of personal identity begin from - if only to repudiate - the conceptual framework bequeathed by Locke. In this chapter, I show how distinct formulations of animalism8 emerge from different strategies for rejecting Locke's view. Whereas the first, Somatic Animalism9, holds that the fundamental nature of (human) animals is physical, the alternative, Organic Animalism10, maintains that the fundamental nature of (human) animals is biological. In defence of Organicism, I introduce an account of animal persistence that avoids the problems which render Somaticism untenable.
- Chapter 3: Objections to Animalism11: The purpose of this chapter is to answer five key objections to animalism12. The first objection that I consider derives from Ted Sider's argument that talk of personal identity is semantically indeterminate as between the bodily criterion and the psychological criterion. Contra Sider, I argue that Organic Animalism13 fares at least as well as, if not better than, its bodily and psychological rivals. The next two objections are what I call duplication objections. An example of this kind of objection takes its cue from cases of dicephalus – an actual condition that occurs when (prior to implantation) a human zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in a two-headed human being, each of whose brains supports a distinct mental life. The anti-animalist objects that, because they instance two persons but only one organism, dicephalic twins provide a counter-example to the animalist’s14 claim that each of us is numerically identical with a single human animal15. Two more objections fall under the heading of transfer objections. A familiar example of this type of objection is the imaginary case of a cerebrum transplant16, in which your cerebrum17 is transferred into a cerebrum-less18 body. Against the animalist19, it is objected that such an operation would have the effect of transferring you to a new body. If this intuition is correct, the anti-animalist concludes, you were not identical to the human animal20 in which you formerly resided. My reply to these transfer objections is largely methodological.
- Chapter 4: Essentialism, Taxonomy, and Homo Sapiens: In this chapter, I consider how animalism21 might be rendered compatible with two (related) views which enjoy great popularity amongst evolutionary biologists, systematists, and philosophers of biology. The first view is simply anti-essentialism about species. According to the second view, a species (like Homo sapiens) is not a natural kind, but a natural individual: not a class whose members instantiate certain essential properties, but a historical entity whose parts are genealogically-related organisms.
- Chapter 5: Constitution, Art Objects, and Self-Reference: In this chapter, I attack the so-called 'constitution view' from a rather oblique perspective. Those who defend the constitution view make much of an analogy with art objects. Their thought is that, just as (for instance) the statue is non-identically constituted by the piece of marble, so too the person you are is non-identically constituted by an animal. I exploit this analogy, argue (on purely aesthetic grounds) for the falsity of the claim about art objects, and then apply that moral to our case. Along the way, I explore what the animalist22 should say about self-reference.
- Chapter 6: Animalism23, Vegetarianism, and Potentiality: In this final chapter, I consider some of the possible ethical implications of the animalist24 position - arguing that, in the case of vegetarianism, there aren't any, and that with respect to the so-called 'potentiality problem' (in the debate about abortion), there are.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)