- Metaphysical modalities1 are definable from counterfactual conditionals, and the epistemology of the former is a special case of the epistemology of the latter.
- In particular, the role of conceivability and inconceivability in assessing claims of possibility and impossibility can be explained as a special case of the pervasive role of the imagination in assessing counterfactual conditionals, an account of which is sketched.
- Thus scepticism about metaphysical modality2 entails a more far-reaching scepticism about counterfactuals.
- The account is used to question the significance of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
- See Link (Defunct)
- To appear in Grazer Philosophische Studien 2007
- and in Christian Beyer and Alex Burri (eds.), Philosophical Knowledge — Its Possibility and Scope, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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