Temporal Predication and Supervenience Failure
Sattig (Thomas)
Source: Sattig - The Language and Reality of Time, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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Author's Introduction1

  1. An account of temporal supervenience2 requires an account of temporal predication — a semantic account of the language in which facts about ordinary time are stated. For the detenser, the problem of temporal predication is essentially the task of giving an account of the semantic function of the modifier 'at t' in 'a is F at t'. In the project of explaining temporal supervenience3, an account of temporal predication functions as an analysis of ordinary temporal facts, which is required to build an explanatory bridge from these temporal facts to their spatiotemporal supervenience4 base.
  2. In Chapter 3, I discuss various accounts of temporal predication that share the common feature that temporal supervenience5 cannot be explained on the basis of them, because these accounts allow no plausible explanatory link between the facts of persistence and change and any facts about spacetime.

Contents
  1. The Relational Account
  2. Relational Supervenience6 Failure
  3. The Intensional Account
  4. Intensional Supervenience7 Failure
  5. Adverbialism

Comment:

Not held



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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