Four-Dimensionalist Supervenience
Sattig (Thomas)
Source: Sattig - The Language and Reality of Time, Chapter 4
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryText Colour-Conventions


Author's Introduction1

  1. In Chapter 4, a new account of temporal predication — the representational account — is combined with four-dimensionalism to yield the temporal-parts account of temporal supervenience2. This elegant account asserts and explains the theses that the facts of persistence logically supervene3 on facts about the spatiotemporal location of temporal parts of objects, and that the facts of temporal instantiation logically supervene4 on facts about the atemporal instantiation of properties by temporal parts of objects.
  2. I further show that the questions of temporal supervenience5 as well as the four-dimensionalist answers to these questions have interesting spatial and modal analogues. Despite its success in explaining the supervenience6 of facts of persistence and change, the temporal-parts account has objectionable consequences.
  3. I raise three problems, the most serious of which is the problem of predicational overkill. Each of these problems concerns the account's failure to capture certain ordinary temporal facts.

Contents
  1. The Temporal-parts Account
  2. Temporal and Modal Supervenience7
  3. Spatial Supervenience8 and Space-Time Asymmetry
  4. Extreme Four-Dimensionalism and Ontological Parsimony
  5. Predicational Overkill
  6. The Temporal-counterparts Account

Comment:

Not held



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - April 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page