Are Souls Unintelligible?
Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary)
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 5, Philosophy of Religion (1991), pp. 183-212
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Authors’ Introduction

  1. In asserting the existence of God, traditional Western theism asserts the existence of a purely spiritual being. According to this form of theism, God is a disembodied1 spirit, or soul, with the power to effect material things. In addition, many theists are committed to the existence of other souls that have this power, e.g., angels, devils, or human souls.
  2. A variety of objections have been raised to the intelligibility of both the notion of a soul and the notion of a soul effecting a material thing. Since traditional Western theism presupposes the intelligibility of these notions, the soundness of any of these objections entails the unintelligibility of this form of theism. Our aim is to defend the intelligibility of the concepts of a soul and of dualistic interactionism against these objections

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Jan 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page