The Puzzle of Change
Bottani (Andrea C.)
Source: Dialectica, 59.4, December 2005, pp. 381-400(20). Introduction.
Paper - Abstract

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    The world changes. On the one hand, things come into and go out of existence; on the other, they lose and gain properties while they exist. However contingent it may be, this is an important, natural and pervasive feature of reality. Yet philosophers have traditionally seen change as a paradoxical feature of reality, a source of great ontological puzzlement. One might ask why. Why on earth should such a natural, pervasive and uncontroversial phenomenon be treated as a philosophical paradox? I shall begin by saying why change raises a philosophical problem and how the problem can be stated. Then, I shall offer some sketchy taxonomical remarks concerning some well-known theories of change. This will also yield a general picture of the relations those theories bear to a great range of philosophical topics, from mereology to the philosophy of modality1 and the philosophy of time, and explain how the following papers and commentaries are relevant to some of them. So, to begin with, what problem is there about change? .

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