The Recent History of Materialism: The Same Mistake
Searle (John)
Source: Searle - The Rediscovery of the Mind, 1992, Chapter 2
Paper - Abstract

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  1. The Mystery of Materialism
  2. Behaviorism
  3. Type Identity Theories
  4. Token-Token Identity Theories
  5. Black Box Functionalism
  6. Strong Artificial Intelligence
  7. Elliminative Materialism
  8. Naturalising Content
  9. The Moral So Far
    Table 2.1 The General Pattern Exhibited by Recent Materialism


    Common-Sense Objections

    Technical Objections

    Logical behaviorism

    Leaves out the mind: super-spartan / super-actor objections

    1. Circular; needs desires to explain beliefs, and conversely. 2. Can't do the conditionals. 3. Leaves out causation1.

    Type identity theory

    Leaves out the mind: or else it leads to property dualism

    1. Neural chauvinism. 2. Leibniz's law2. 3. Can't account for mental properties. 4. Modal3 arguments

    Token identity theory

    Leaves out the mind: absent qualia

    Can't identify the mental features of mental content

    Black box functionalism

    Leaves out the mind: absent qualia and spectrum inversion

    Relation of structure and function is unexplained

    Strong Al (Turing machine functionalism)

    Leaves out the mind: Chinese room

    Human cognition is nonrepresentational and therefore noncomputational

    Eliminative materialism (rejection of folk psychology)

    Denies the existence of the mind: unfair to folk psychology

    Defense of folk psychology

    Naturalizing intentionality

    Leaves out intentionality

    Disjunction4 problem

  10. The Idols of the Tribe

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