Same But Different
Maurin (Anna-Sofia)
Source: Metaphysica 6.1 (2005), pp. 129-148
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The article discusses some basic issues for the proper development of a theory for tropes in the light of recent criticisms put forth by Herbert Hochberg. It is argued that tropes, to represent a new category, distinct from already proposed categories, such as states of affairs, facts, universals1 and substrates, must be not only particular qualities, but also simple entities. This does not, contrary to what has been argued by Hochberg, make trope theory impossible. However, it does position trope theory squarely in the revisionary as opposed to descriptive camp--to some, a high price indeed. Talk of “tropes” dates back to D. C. Williams’s (1953) articles on the
    elements of being, although theories similar to the one proposed by
    him certainly existed long before that.1 Williams’s tropes were no instant
    success however, and a debate of today’s kind and calibre would have to
    wait until the publication of the first contemporary book entirely devoted
    to trope theory (Keith Campbell’s Abstract Particulars (1990)). Since then,
    however, discussion has been lively with the number of trope proponents
    increasing. Those who have joined in the effort to bring the theory to its
    most developed expression include, among others, John Bacon, Peter
    Simons, Kevin Mulligan, Käthe Trettin, and myself.

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