Who, Me?
Boer (Steven E.) & Lycan (William)
Source: Philosophical Review, vol. LXXXIX, 1980, pp. 427-466
Paper - Abstract

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Authors’ Introduction (Excerpted)

  1. Some fifteen years ago, Hector-Neri Castaneda argued vigorously and at length that sentences which attribute first- person propositional attitudes are semantically unique.
  2. This view is currently enjoying widespread revival. A growing number of theorists now maintain that the ascription of first-person attitudes or attitudes "de se" cannot be reduced to the ascription of attitudes de re or de dicto.
  3. The main argument for this Irreducibility Thesis is disarmingly simple and straightforward. Consider the following pairs:
    [… snip …]
  4. We are not persuaded. We believe the Irreducibility Thesis should be repudiated. In what follows, we shall set out our case for rejecting the Thesis and for maintaining that a version of the traditional de re / de dicto distinction is adequate in itself to accommodate Castaneda’s data.

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