Personal and Impersonal Identity: A Reply to Oderberg
Sprigge (Timothy L.S.)
Source: Mind, Vol. 98, No. 392 (Oct., 1989), pp. 605-610
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Philosophers Index Abstract

    The Hegelians claimed that genuine identity must be identity in difference. a=a is vacuous, and a=b is false, so a genuine identity truth must be of the form of ax=ay which implies a difference between its terms together with identity. This is usually thought superseded by Frege's treatment, but this only applied to identity truths of an 'ignorance removing' type, not those of permanent interest strictly as identity truths. These latter are best understood, in a somewhat Hegelian way, as concerning universals1, abstract or concrete. This position is defended here against D S Oderberg's criticism of Sprigge's earlier statement of it.

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