Fission, Fusion and Intrinsic Facts
Hawley (Katherine)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming, issue dated November 2005)
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    Closest-continuer or best-candidate1 accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it’s hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the ‘only a and b’ rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience2 of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience3 claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer4 accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence.

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