Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?
Yablo (Stephen)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 53, No. 1, Mar., 1993, pp. 1-42
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    This paper outlines the standard objections to conceivability arguments; proposes a reading of "conceivable" that escapes these objections; maintains the general reliability of modal1 intuition while admitting the phenomena of modal2 error and disagreement; attempts to explain these phenomena in terms of prior and independent cognitive miscues; and considers finally the modal3 realism debate, stressing the importance of well-disciplined modal4 dialectic.

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