Strawson, Hume, and the Unity of Consciousness
Brooks (D.H.M.)
Source: Mind, Vol. 94, No. 376, Oct., 1985, pp. 583-586
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Strawson argues that Hume was confused when he looked for a principle of the unity of the self. A premise in Strawson's argument is that one cannot identify others "only" as subjects of experience and possessors of consciousness. I argue against this premise by means of a thought experiment1 based on Quinton on dreaming.

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