Philosophical Method and The Theory of Predication and Identity
Castaneda (Hector-Neri)
Source: Nous, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May, 1978), pp. 189-210
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The problems of referential opacity in psychological contexts require a solution, of which three types are indicated, that contains a profound theory of predication, identity, and individuation1. A radical theory, not in the spirit of the current fashions, is outlined. It is called the guise-consubstantiation, conflation, and consociation theory. This theory was first expounded in "Thinking and the structure of the world," "Philosophia" (1974) and "Critica" (1972). The present paper is an introduction to this essay, motivated by two criticisms of Romane Clark in "Not every object of thought has being," "Nous" (1978). It is shown that Clark's arguments rest on equivocations, one involving the data and the theory, and the other within the theory itself. Thus, a discussion of philosophical method turns out to be crucial, and an analysis of expression 'true of' is offered.

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