|The Case for Phenomenal Externalism|
|Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 11; Oct2001, p17, 19p|
|Paper - Abstract|
Philosophers Index Abstract
The suggestion has been made by Lycan and by Fred Dretske that phenomenal qualia are "wide," and do not supervene1 on the internal states of their owners. The present paper argues directly for that claim and then rebuts thirteen objections to it.
Argues in favor of the phenomenal externalism of qualia, at after-image or perceptual contents of cognitive and perceptional attitudes. Existence of qualia in customary and familiar sense; Author's representational theory of qualia; Responses to arguments that qualia are narrow.
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