A Naive Variety of Logical Consequence
Alonso (Enrique)
Source: Sorites 3, November 1995: 12-26
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    The semantic analysis of logical consequence must obey a set of requisites which nowadays have acquired a dogmatic status. This situation prevents the development of other varieties of this fundamental relation. In this issue we try to define what we call a naive variety of logical consequence. The main feature of this relation is the way it depends on formulas in premises and conclusion: every sentence must contribute to the acceptability of an argument in a significative way. This circumstance can be of some interest for research programs demanding a logical apparatus sensitive to application context. We think of the logic LP developed by G. Priest — Priest [1979] — in relation to Gödel incompleteness theorems as a test for our points of view.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 03

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