A Note on Truth, Deflationism and Irrealism
Miraglia (Pierluigi)
Source: Sorites 3, November 1995: 48-63
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    The paper deals with a problem about irrealist doctrines of content, according to which there are no real properties answering to content-attributing expressions. The central claim of the paper is that the distinction between factual and nonfactual discourse (key to irrealism) is independent from particular conceptions of truth, and is thus compatible with a deflationary conception. This claim is sustained by an examination of what I take to be significant aspects of the deflationary conception. I argue therefore directly against Paul Boghossian’s paper «The Status of Content», which attempted to show that irrealism about content is inconsistent.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 03

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