Reasoning with Imperatives Using Classical Logic
Fulda (Joseph)
Source: Sorites 3, November 1995: 7-11
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    Traditionally, imperatives have been handled with deontic logics, not the logic of propositions which bear truth values. Yet, an imperative is issued by the speaker to cause (stay) actions which change the state of affairs, which is, in turn, described by propositions that bear truth values. Thus, ultimately, imperatives affect truth values. In this paper, we put forward an idea that allows us to reason with imperatives using classical logic by constructing a one-to-one correspondence between imperatives and a particular class of declaratives.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 03

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