On Behalf of the Fool: Moore and Our Knowledge of the Existence of Material Objects
Martin (Edward)
Source: Sorites 4, February 1996: 40-52
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    In this paper I argue that G.E. Moore's naturalism (combined with his sense-data theory) falls prey to the charge, leveled recently by Plantinga, that Moore doesn't know whether his belief-forming mechanisms are functioning properly when he says he knows


Filed electronically with full edition of Sorites 04

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