Truth in Pure Semantics: A Reply to Putnam
Moreno (Luis Fernández)
Source: Sorites 8, January 1997: 15-23
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    In his book Representation and Reality Hilary Putnam raises a number of objections against the semantical conception of truth. According to Putnam two particularly undesirable consequences of the semantical conception of truth are that the equivalences of the form (T) are logically necessary and that the truth of a sentence does not depend on its meaning. In this paper I examine these two objections of Putnam with respect to Carnap’s formulation of the semantical conception of truth.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 08

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