Frankfurt, Failure, and Finding Fault
White (V. Alan)
Source: Sorites 9, April 1998: 47-52
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    Harry Frankfurt’s famous examples of overdetermined moral agents who are nevertheless responsible for their actions and omissions have long been hailed as proofs that the ability and/or opportunity to do otherwise (Principle of Alternative Possibilities — PAP) is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. In this paper I use recent clarifications of some of these examples by Frankfurt himself to show that their force relies in part on tacit ceteris paribus assumptions concealing a reliance on PAP that concerns matters of fairness in assessing moral responsibility.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 09

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