Complementary Properties and Persisting Objects: Ontological Constraints on the Semantics of Sentences of the Type 'O is phi at T'
Bordes (Montse)
Source: Sorites 10, May 1999: 39-59
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    Even the most Parmenidean-minded of people recognize that quotidian objects somehow undergo change. This claim, nonetheless, is as clearly intuitive as it is apparently incompatible with one of our most widely believed logical principles, namely, Leibniz’s Law. This paper focuses briefly on the metaphysical issue underlying this alleged incompatibility in order to provide elements for exploring its semantical counterpart: the analysis of the logical form of sentences attributing complementary temporal properties to current objects. Four analyses are presented, and the ability of each to account for the linguistic data is explained. The semantical issue is preceded by some introductory remarks on the role of temporal references in the evaluation of declarative sentences.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 10

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