Dispositionalism and Meaning Skepticism
Pinto (Silvio)
Source: Sorites 12, May 2001: 70-86
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsColour-ConventionsDisclaimer

Author’s Abstract

    In a recent thought-provoking paper on skepticism concerning meaning (1997), Scott Soames claims that Kripke’s and Quine’s arguments that there are no facts about meanings are flawed for similar reasons. According to Soames, both of them are based on a confusion about how a certain kind of fact determines another (for instance, what it takes for a dispositional fact to determine a particular linguistic meaning). Soames’ strategy to refute the skeptical arguments advanced by Kripke and Quine involves distinguishing two notions of determination both of which, if applied unambiguously and consistently throughout the formulation of the above skeptical reasonings, would fall short of licensing the far-reaching and devastating skeptical conclusions that their proponents intended them to have. This paper is an attempt to vindicate the problem raised by the meaning skeptic, and to show that Soames’ suggested dispositional account cannot even partially solve it.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 12

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Jan 2019. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page