Frankfurt on Personal Failure
White (Alan)
Source: Sorites 12, May 2001: 66-69
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer

Author’s Abstract

    Over the years there have appeared a number of theoretical and metatheoretical broadsides against Harry Frankfurt’s familiar arguments denying that a free moral agent have alternatives in some real sense as a necessary condition for her moral responsibility. In what follows I will attempt to focus on a particular defensive strategy of Frankfurt’s, which, when analyzed, yields evidence that such attacks, particularly the metatheoretical ones, are not misplaced.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 12

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - March 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page